[simpits-chat] Fwd: Fw: Flight Safety Information (09JAN03-014) (fwd)

[Gene Buckle]

>Flight Safety Information (09JAN03-014)
>_________________________________
>
>*Peruvian airline reports plane with
> 42 passengers missing in jungle
>*2 Military Planes Collide in Turkey
>*Two Black Boxes Recovered From N.C. Crash
>*ALPA President to Congress: Intransigent Government Board,
> Crushing Taxes and Security Costs Strangle Airlines
>*Korean Air Expands China Routes
>**********************************************
>
>Peruvian airline reports plane with 42 passengers missing in jungle
>
>LIMA, Peru - A plane carrying 42 passengers disappeared while flying
over
>the Amazon jungle Thursday after controllers lost radio contact with it
>shortly before its scheduled landing.
>
>Tans Airline Flight 1396 was three minutes from landing at an airport in
the
>jungle city of Chachapoyas, 650 kilometers (400 miles) north of Lima,
when
>radio contact was lost with the plane, said Jorge Belevan, a spokesman
for
>the Peruvian airline.
>
>"That is when we lost contact with the plane, and we don't have more
>information," he said.
>
>Belevan said the Air Force was searching for the plane, a Fokker 28.
>
>The plane was flying from the coastal city of Chiclayo, 660 kilometers
(410
>miles) northwest of Lima, he said.
>*****************
>
>2 Military Planes Collide in Turkey
>
>ISTANBUL, Turkey (AP) - Two F-4 fighter jets collided
>Thursday in heavy fog during a training flight in
>southeastern Turkey, the same region where a jetliner
>crashed near a fog-shrouded airport on Wednesday. The
>pilots and navigators parachuted from the jets, but
>their conditions were not immediately clear.
>
>The planes crashed in the southeastern province of
>Malatya, Anatolia reported. The planes each carry two
>people.
>
>Air force officials were not available for comment.
>
>The incident came a day after a Turkish Airlines
>passenger jet crashed in nearby Diyarbakir on its way
>from Istanbul, killing 75 people and injuring five
>others.
>*****************
>
>Two Black Boxes Recovered From N.C. Crash
>
>CHARLOTTE, N.C. (AP) - The cockpit voice recorder from the commuter
plane
>that crashed has ``very good'' sound, but there are a few problems with
the
>other so-called black box, a federal investigator said Thursday.
>
>The fiery crash Wednesday - the deadliest U.S. air accident in more than
a
>year - killed all 21 aboard the US Airways Express flight.
>
>The cause of the crash was unclear, and investigators said they were
ruling
>nothing out. The FBI said there was no preliminary indication of
terrorism.
>
>Crash investigators likely will check into possible engine failure or
pilot
>error, whether ice was on the wings and whether the flaps deployed
>correctly, said Chuck Eastlake, an aerospace engineering professor at
>Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona Beach, Fla.
>
>The flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were recovered
Wednesday
>and sent to Washington for analysis.
>
>``Not too long ago we received word back from Washington that we have a
very
>good (voice) recorder,'' John Goglia, a National Transportation Safety
Board
>member, said Thursday on CBS' ``The Early Show.''
>
>But he told ABC's ``Good Morning America'' that the flight data recorder
has
>not been played out yet, because an investigator ``had some problems
getting
>data out of it.''
>
>The pilot, identified by US Airways as Katie Leslie of Charlotte,
contacted
>the tower at takeoff to report an emergency, said Greg Martin, a
spokesman
>for the Federal Aviation Administration.
>
>``However, (the transmission) was cut short and the emergency was never
>identified,'' he said.
>
>Flight 5481 was taking off from Charlotte/Douglas International Airport
just
>before 9 a.m. Wednesday when the Beech 1900 twin-engine turboprop veered
>back toward the ground, clipping a corner of a hangar as it fell. The
plane
>had 19 passengers and two crew members.
>
>``It just happened so quickly,'' said Yvonne Hepler, who saw the crash
from
>about 500 yards away. ``It just disintegrated in a matter of seconds.''
>
>Her co-worker Dee Addison ran outside to see people running from a
>maintenance hangar.
>
>``It didn't even look like a plane,'' she said. ``It was totally
>demolished.''
>
>No one on the ground was injured, though a portion of the US Airways
hangar
>was scorched and battered. Layers of smoke poured from the wreckage, so
>thick ``you could taste it in your mouth,'' Addison said.
>
>The NTSB brought 26 investigators. Walking the runway Wednesday, they
found
>some bolts and small pieces of debris but had not determined whether
they
>belonged to the plane, Goglia said.
>
>The flight originated in Lynchburg, Va., and was heading from Charlotte
to
>the Greenville-Spartanburg airport in Greer, S.C. Officials said none of
the
>passengers started their trip in Charlotte, though some had connected
there
>from other flights.
>
>A maintenance alert for the type of plane involved in the crash was
issued
>in August indicating that attachment bolts for the vertical stabilizer
were
>found loose on one plane during a scheduled inspection.
>
>The FAA has issued nearly two dozen airworthiness directives on the
1900-D
>since 1994. The directives warn of problems that must be repaired if
found
>in an aircraft.
>
>A directive issued in November and scheduled to be effective in two days
>warned that screws in the elevator balance weight attachment could come
>loose and interfere with the horizontal stabilizer.
>
>The plane, built in 1996, was one of about 50 operated by Mesa Air
Lines, US
>Airways said. It operated under the US Airways Express name and had been
>flown 15,000 hours and performed 21,000 takeoffs and landings.
>
>FAA records showed the aircraft was involved in five in-flight incidents
>that the NTSB said could affect safe operations. The aircraft also
reported
>10 lesser service difficulties.
>
>Officials with Mesa Air Lines' parent company, Phoenix-based Mesa Air
Group,
>said the company has been phasing out the model in favor of regional
jets
>but haven't had major problems with the turboprops.
>
>The crash came after a year when no one died aboard a passenger or cargo
>airliner in the United States. It was the third time in a decade that a
year
>went by without a fatality on a commercial plane, according to the FAA.
>
>The last was the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 in New York on
Nov.
>12, 2001, in which 265 people died.
>
>On the Net:
>
>Mesa Air Group: http://www.mesa-air.com
>
>US Airways news releases http://www.usairways.com/about/press
>
>Charlotte/Douglas International Airport: http://flycdia.com
>****************
>
>ALPA President to Congress: Intransigent Government Board, Crushing
Taxes
>and Security Costs Strangle Airlines
>
>WASHINGTON, Jan. 9 /PRNewswire/ -- The head of the nation's largest
pilots'
>union today told a Senate committee that the airline industry is being
>slowly strangled by a combination of crushing taxes and security costs,
plus
>the refusal of the Air Transportation Stabilization Board (ATSB) to
provide
>relief mandated by Congress to help airlines in the wake of the Sept. 11
>terrorist attacks.
>
>"For airline workers, the consequences have been devastating. More than
>150,000 airline and aerospace employees are now laid off and thousands
more
>brace for lay-off as air carriers struggle to emerge from or avoid
>bankruptcy and aircraft purchases continue to sag," said Capt. Duane
Woerth,
>president of the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA).
Woerth
>was testifying at hearings by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and
>Transportation, on the state of the airline industry.
>
>With the industry losing $6.2 billion in 2001, an estimated $7.4 billion
in
>2002, and a facing a projected loss of $3-$4 billion in 2003, Woerth
said
>that Congress needs to correct the failure of the ATSB to provide
mandated
>loan guarantees to airlines, ease taxes on airline tickets (which eat up
>25.6 percent of a $200 fare) and relieve airlines of $4 billion in
mandated
>but unfunded security costs.
>
>"Our pilots are ready and willing to work together with management and
the
>government to solve the problems of the airline industry. This is not a
>time to impart blame. Labor-bashing, as we have seen within certain
>elements of the airline industry, won't turn this industry around,"
Woerth
>said.
>
>ALPA represents 66,000 airline pilots at 42 airlines in the U.S. and
Canada.
>Read the entire ALPA submission at http://www.alpa.org .
>
>SOURCE Air Line Pilots Association
>*****************
>
>The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following
recommendations
>to the Federal Aviation Administration:
>
>Issue a flight standards information bulletin directing air carriers to
>instruct pilots that in the event of an inoperative or malfunctioning
flight
>control system, if the airplane is controllable they should complete
only
>the applicable checklist procedures and should not attempt any
corrective
>actions beyond those specified. In particular, in the event of an
>inoperative or malfunctioning horizontal stabilizer trim control system,
>after a final determination has been made in accordance with the
applicable
>checklist that both the primary and alternate trim systems are
inoperative,
>neither the primary nor the alternate trim motor should be activated,
either
>by engaging the autopilot or using any other trim
>control switch or handle. Pilots should further be instructed that if
>checklist procedures are not effective, they should land at the nearest
>suitable airport. (A-02-36)
>
>Direct all certificate management offices to instruct inspectors to
conduct
>surveillance of airline dispatch and maintenance control personnel to
ensure
>that their training and operations directives provide appropriate
dispatch
>support to pilots who are experiencing a malfunction threatening safety
of
>flight and instruct them to refrain from suggesting continued flight in
the
>interest of airline flight scheduling. (A-02-37)
>
>As part of the response to Safety Recommendation A-01-41, require
operators
>of Douglas DC-9, McDonnell Douglas MD-80/90, and Boeing 717 series
airplanes
>to remove degraded grease from the jackscrew assembly acme screw and
flush
>degraded grease and particulates from the acme nut before applying fresh
>grease. (A-02-38)
>
>As part of the response to Safety Recommendation A-01-41, require
operators
>of Douglas DC-9, McDonnell Douglas MD-80/90, and Boeing 717 series
>airplanes, in coordination with Boeing, to increase the size of the
access
>panels that are used to accomplish the jackscrew assembly lubrication
>procedure. (A-02-39)
>
>Establish the jackscrew assembly lubrication procedure as a required
>inspection item that must have an inspector's signoff before the task
can be
>considered complete. (A-02-40)
>
>Review all existing maintenance intervals for tasks that could affect
>critical aircraft components and identify those that have been extended
>without adequate engineering justification in the form of technical data
and
>analysis demonstrating that the extended interval will not present any
>increased risk and require modifications of those intervals to ensure
that
>they (1) take into account assumptions made by the original
>designers, (2) are supported by adequate technical data and analysis,
and
>(3) include an appropriate safety margin that takes into account the
>possibility of missed or inadequate accomplishment of the maintenance
task.
>In conducting this review, the Federal Aviation Administration should
also
>consider original intervals recommended or established for new aircraft
>models that are derivatives of earlier models and, if the aircraft
component
>and the task are substantially the same and the recommended interval for
the
>new model is greater
>than that recommended for the earlier model, treat such original
intervals
>for the derivative model as "extended" intervals. (A-02-41)
>
>Conduct a systematic industrywide evaluation and issue a report on the
>process by which manufacturers recommend and airlines establish and
revise
>maintenance task intervals and make changes to the process to ensure
that,
>in the future, intervals for each task (1) take into account assumptions
>made by the original designers, (2) are supported by adequate technical
data
>and analysis, and (3) include an appropriate safety margin that takes
into
>account the possibility of missed or inadequate accomplishment of the
>maintenance task. (A-02-42)
>
>Require operators to supply the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
>before the implementation of any changes in maintenance tasks intervals
that
>could affect critical aircraft components, technical data and analysis
for
>each task demonstrating that none of the proposed changes will present
any
>potential hazards, and obtain written approval of the proposed changes
from
>the principal maintenance inspector and written concurrence from the
>appropriate FAA aircraft certification office. (A-02-43)
>
>Pending the incorporation of a fail-safe mechanism in the design of the
>Douglas DC-9, McDonnell Douglas MD-80/90, and Boeing 717 horizontal
>stabilizer jackscrew assembly, as recommended in Safety Recommendation
>A-02-49, establish an end play check interval that (1) accounts for the
>possibility of higher-than-expected wear rates and measurement error in
>estimating acme nut thread wear and (2) provides for at least two
>opportunities to detect excessive wear before a potentially catastrophic
>wear condition becomes possible. (A-02-44)
>
>Require operators to permanently (1) track end play measures according
to
>airplane registration number and jackscrew assembly serial number, (2)
>calculate and record average wear rates for each airplane based on end
play
>measurements and flight times, and (3) develop and implement a program
to
>analyze these data to identify and determine the cause of excessive or
>unexpected wear rates, trends, or anomalies. The Federal Aviation
>Administration (FAA) should also require operators to report this
>information to the FAA for use in determining and evaluating an
appropriate
>end play check interval. (A-02-45)
>
>Require that maintenance facilities that overhaul jackscrew assemblies
>record and inform customers of an overhauled jackscrew assembly's end
play
>measurement. (A-02-46)
>
>Require operators to measure and record the on-wing end play measurement
>whenever a jackscrew assembly is replaced. (A-02-47)
>
>Require that maintenance facilities that overhaul Douglas DC-9,
McDonnell
>Douglas MD-80/90, and Boeing 717 series airplanes' jackscrew assemblies
>obtain specific authorization to perform such overhauls, predicated on
>demonstrating that they possess the necessary capability, documentation,
and
>equipment for the task and that they have procedures in place to (1)
perform
>and document the detailed steps that must
>be followed to properly accomplish the end play check procedure and
>lubrication of the jackscrew assembly, including specification of
>appropriate tools and grease types; (2) perform and document the
appropriate
>steps for verifying that the proper acme screw thread surface
>finish has been applied; and (3) ensure that appropriate packing
procedures
>are followed for all returned overhauled jackscrew assemblies,
regardless of
>whether the assembly has been designated for storage or shipping.
(A-02-48)
>
>Conduct a systematic engineering review to (1) identify means to
eliminate
>the catastrophic effects of total acme nut thread failure in the
horizontal
>stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly in Douglas DC-9 (DC-9),
McDonnel
>Douglas MD-80/90 (MD-80/90), and Boeing 717 (717) series airplanes and
>require, if practicable, that such fail-safe mechanisms be incorporated
in
>the design of all existing and future DC-9,
>MD-80/90, and 717 series airplanes and their derivatives; (2) evaluate
the
>horizontal stabilizer trim systems of all other transport-category
airplanes
>to identify any designs that have a catastrophic single-point failure
mode
>and, for any such system; (3) identify means to eliminate the
catastrophic
>effects of that single-point failure mode and, if practicable, require
that
>such fail-safe mechanisms be incorporated in the design of all existing
and
>future airplanes that are equipped with such horizontal stabilizer trim
>systems (A-02-49)
>
>Modify the certification regulations, policies, or procedures to ensure
that
>new horizontal stabilizer trim control system designs are not certified
if
>they have a single-point catastrophic failure mode, regardless of
whether
>any element of that system is considered structure rather than system or
is
>otherwise considered exempt from certification standards for systems.
>(A-02-50)
>
>Review and revise aircraft certification regulations and associated
guidance
>applicable to the certification of transport-category airplanes to
ensure
>that wear-related failures are fully considered and addressed so that,
to
>the maximum extent possible, they will not be catastrophic. (A-02-51)
>****************
>
>Korean Air Expands China Routes
>
>Adds New Destination Plus 2 New Routes
>
>LOS ANGELES, Jan. 9 /PRNewswire/ -- Korean Air has announced a plan to
>further expand its route structure to China by adding Xian as a new
>destination, and Cheongju-Shanghai and Busan-Xian as new routes.
>
>With these additions, Korean Air will be operating 17 routes to 12
>destinations and a total of 75 weekly flights to China, positioning it
as
>one of the most active airlines in the important Chinese market.
>
>These new routes between S. Korea and China have come in time to meet
the
>increased demand for travel between the two countries. In 2002, Korean
Air
>increased its seat supply by 32 percent, in comparison with 2001, in
order
>to meet the soaring demand. In response, the number of passengers who
had
>traveled between S. Korea and China on Korean Air increased by 34
percent
>over 2001. This expansion is expected to generate further schedule
>conveniences for passengers and give an impetus to increased travel
between
>S. Korea and China.
>
>Cheongju - Shanghai
>
>Three weekly flights (Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays) between
Cheongju
>and Shanghai will start operating Jan. 11, 2003. Departure time for
>Tuesdays from Cheongju is 2:50 p.m., arriving in Shanghai at 4 p.m.
(local
>time), while departures for Thursdays and Saturdays are scheduled for
2:45
>p.m. arriving at 3:55 p.m. (local time). Tuesday and Thursday departures
>from Shanghai are at 5 p.m. arriving Cheongju at 7:50 p.m. Saturday
>departures from Shanghai are at 4:55 p.m. arriving at 7:45 p.m. An F100
>with a seat capacity of 109 will be used on the flights and the
estimated
>flight time is 2 hours and 10 minutes.
>
>Busan - Xian
>
>For the new Busan-Xian route, two weekly flights (Monday and Thursday)
are
>scheduled to operate effective Jan. 9, 2003. Flights from Busan will
depart
>at 9:30 a.m. and arrive in Xian at 12:05 p.m. while flights departing
from
>Xian will leave at 1:15 p.m. and arrive at Busan Int'l Airport at 5:10
p.m.
>The aircraft on this route is a Boeing 737-800 with a seat capacity of
161.
>
>Shanghai is widely considered to be the center of trading and banking in
>Asia. Xian, on the other hand, has played a very important role in
cultural
>exchanges between those of the East and West, with its unique location
at
>the crossroads of two cultures.
>
>About Korean Air
>
>Korean Air, with a fleet of 120 aircraft, is one of the world's top 20
>airlines and operates almost 400 passenger flights per day to 81 cities
in
>28 countries. Korean Air is a founding member of SkyTeam, the global
>alliance -- partnering AeroMexico, Air France, Alitalia, CSA Czech
Airlines
>and Delta Air Lines. More on Korean Air's programs, routes, frequency
and
>partners is available at www.koreanair.com.
>
>SOURCE Korean Air
>